Chronicles 11
War is unpopular with Russians
On 17-22 October 2023 we held a phone poll. The final sample consisted of 1600 people, distributed by socio-demographic and territorial characteristics according to Rosstat. The anonymised data set and analytical report are available on our Github page.
Key findings:
Pro-war Russians are a minority, and are significantly outnumbered by pro-peace Russians
Core of war support reduced to 12% (compared to 22% in February 2023)
44% of respondents experience the decrease in family income, 20% report that important medicines are no longer available (in October 2022 only 16% said that). Only 5% of Russians expect that their income will improve due to an increase of military spending in 2024.
52% of Russians recently faced anxiety or depression (compared to 32% in March 2022). People with lower income are more likely to report anxiety or depression.
Core of war support reduced to 12%
All sensible indicators show that Russians express less support for the war.
For the first time in our observations, there are more Russians who would support Putin's decision to withdraw troops and start peace talks without reaching goals of the war: 40% vs 33% of those who wouldn't support such a decision. The number of those in favor of such a decision is stable over the year: 39-40%. However, the number of those who wouldn't accept withdrawal without reaching military goals steadily reduces from 47% in February 2023 to 39% in July 2023 and 33% in October 2023.
WOULD SUPPORT WITHDRAWAL
WOULD NOT SUPPORT WITHDRAWAL
February 2023
July 2023
October 2023
"If Vladimir Putin makes a decision to withdraw troops from Ukraine and start peace talks, without reaching firstly stated goals of special military operation, would you support or not support such a decision of Vladimir Putin?"
The number of consistent war supporters also hit the historic minimum of 12%. Consistent war supporters are those who simultaneously express support for the war, wouldn't support Putin's decision to withdraw troops from Ukraine and start peace talks without reaching the goals of the war and believe that army expenses* should be the priority for the state budget. In February 2023 the number was 22%.
Wouldn't support decision to withdraw without reaching goals of the war
Believe that army expenses
should be the priority
Consistent supporters of the war
Expressed support for the war
52%
Consistent supporters of the war: expressed support for the war, wouldn't support Putin's decision to withdraw troops from Ukraine and start peace talks without reaching goals of the war and believe that army expenses* should be the priority for the state budget
February 2023
October 2023
Consistent supporters of the war: dynamics
Frontal question — "Do you support or don't support the special military operation in Ukraine" — isn't a meaningful indicator of support for the war because it includes a very wide range of opinions from "I am already at the frontlines" to "I'm afraid to tell what I really think so I will lie and say that I support the war". It's impossible to use this question alone to draw any meaningful conclusions. We've established through an experiment that a significant proportion of respondents is likely to choose this option out of fear (for more details please see Chapter 2: https://chronicles.report/en/chapter2). But even this indicator is at its historic minimum: 51%.
Number of Russians with consistent pro-peace position is almost stable. In February 2023 it was 20%, now it's 18,5%. This group includes those who simultaneously don't express support for the war, would support Putin's decision to withdraw troops from Ukraine and start peace talks without reaching military goals and believes that social spending should be the priority for the budget. It's worth mentioning that as the first parameter we accept "didn't express support for the war", not "declared that doesn't support the war", because, as mentioned above, people are afraid to state their opposition to the war. So two other meaningful questions show that they are pro-peace.
Would support decision to withdraw without reaching goals of the war
Believe that social spending should be the priority for the budget
Russians with consistent pro-peace position
Didn't express support for the war
Russians with consistent pro-peace position: didn't express support for the war, would support decision to withdraw without reaching goals of the war and believe that social spending should be the priority for the budget
February 2023
October 2023
Russians with consistent pro-peace position: dynamics
Thus all meaningful indicators show that now there are less pro-war Russians, than pro-peace Russians, and consistent supporters of war are a minority of just 12%. Most likely it's not a deviation but a result of a trend that persists over most of 2023.
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* — In 11th piece of research (as compared to 9th piece of research) we've introduced two changes in this question. Firstly, we made an experiment. Two identical subsamples got different wordings of this question: one wording included "in condition of budget deficit", the other didn't. Secondly, we've corrected a prompt about social spending, having added the word "pensions" ("In your opinion, what should be a budget priority: armed forces of social sphere, including healthcare, education and pensions"). Through the first experiment we found out that the phrase "in conditions of budget deficit" has no impact on the number of those who choose "armed forces". Also we've shown that the trend (compared to February 2023) for the reduction of the number of those in favor of military spending by 10-12% is active for all age groups and doesn't depend on the status of pension receiver. Thus the change in the wording can't explain the significant drop in the number of those in favor of military spendings in this question.