Chronicles 14
You can view the text of the full report, the questionnare and the database of respondents' responses in Russian in our repository on GitHub. If you need these files in English, please, write to us at web@chronicles.report.
Results of the survey conducted by the Chronicles research project on the third anniversary of the war in Ukraine
From February 5 to 13, 2025, the Chronicles research project conducted a telephone survey among the adult population of Russia. A total of 1,600 respondents were interviewed. The sample was nationwide and random (more about the method). The maximum measurement error is 2.95% with a 95% confidence interval.
Key point: More than half of respondents say that the “special military operation” has had a negative impact on their daily lives.
In brief:
-
The number of consistent supporters of the war remained at 18%, while consistent supporters of peace remained at 21%. However, the number of those who do not support the withdrawal of troops without achieving the goals of the “special military operation” increased to 46% (from 31% in September 2024).
-
More than half of Russians (54%) believe that the “special military operation” has had a negative impact on their daily lives, and only 9% note a positive impact. This assessment correlates with low support for the war and a lower willingness to vote for Putin.
-
People who believe that the end of the “special military operation” depends on US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping tend to believe that the conflict will end in just a few months. At the same time, respondents identify Vladimir Putin as the main player in resolving the conflict, with Trump and Xi in second and third place, respectively.
Opinion dynamics on the “special military operation”: from support for military spending to prioritizing the social sphere
In our research, we do not focus solely on the question of support for the “special military operation” because the information gathered in this way is misleading: answers to this question range from “I lie because I fear persecution” to “I volunteered to go to the front.”
In order to obtain more informative and representative answers, we use a combination of three questions:
-
Attitude toward the “special military operation,”
-
Attitude toward the withdrawal of troops from Ukraine without achieving the goals of the “special military operation,”
-
Attitude toward state budget priorities: the army or social services.
Based on the answers, we identify groups of consistent supporters of the war and consistent supporters of peace.
The group of consistent supporters of the war includes those who simultaneously expressed support for the “special military operation,” would not support the decision to withdraw troops from Ukraine and start peace talks without achieving the goals of the “special military operation,” and believe that in conditions of budget deficit, the government's priority should be the army, not social services.
Wouldn't support decision to withdraw without reaching goals of the war
Believe that army expenses should be the priority
Consistent supporters of the war
Expressed support for the war
18%
36%
52%
46%
We include in the group of consistent supporters of peace those who have not expressed support for the “SMO,” would support a decision to withdraw troops from Ukrainian territory and begin peace negotiations without achieving the goals of the “SMO,” and believe that, given the budget deficit, the government's priority should be the social sphere, not the army.
Would support decision to withdraw without reaching goals of the war
Believe that social spending should be the priority for the budget
Russians with consistent pro-peace position
Didn't express support for the war
41%
48%
48%
21%
Our surveys show that currently 21% of Russians consistently support peace, while 18% support war. The number of peace supporters has grown from 20% in February 2023 to 21% in February 2025. Despite a slight increase in the number of war supporters over the past six months (from 16% in September 2024 to 18% in February 2025), their number has decreased from 23% to 18% over the past two years.
Fewer Russians are willing to spend additional money on the war: in September 2024, 43% of respondents considered military spending a budget priority, while in February 2025, this figure fell to 36%. Accordingly, the number of those who believe that social spending is the most important priority rose from 38% to 48%.
More than half of Russians believe that the “special military operation” is negatively affecting their lives.
We asked Russians: “Has the special operation affected your daily life? If so, would you say it has had a positive or negative impact?”
54% believe that the “special operation” has had a negative impact on their daily lives, 32% say that the war has not affected them, and 9% of respondents noted a positive impact. It is worth noting that when referring to the negative impact of the “special military operation” on their daily lives, respondents apparently have in mind not only material factors: 36% of respondents pointed to a deterioration in their financial situation, but this is less than those who believe that the war has a negative impact on their lives — the difference was 18%.
The number of respondents who believe that their financial situation has deteriorated increased from 27% in September 2024 to 36% in February 2025. Forty percent of working respondents reported that they have to work more, and only 6% felt that their workload had decreased.
Among people who believe that the “special military operation” has a negative impact on their daily lives, support for the war is 22 percentage points lower than the average for all respondents. Among those who have noticed a deterioration in their financial situation, support for the war is 8 percentage points lower. People who have faced financial difficulties are more likely to be consistent supporters of peace. But those who feel the negative impact of the war on their lives are even more likely to consistently support peace. When both the deterioration of financial circumstances and opinions about the impact of the “special military operation” are taken into account, the deterioration of circumstances becomes less important, while the assessment of the war's impact on life remains significant. This means that how people assess the impact of the “special military operation” on their daily lives is a more important indicator than simply dissatisfaction with their financial situation.
Russia's “soft” defeat
41% of Russians support the withdrawal of troops from Ukraine and the start of peace talks without achieving the goals of the “special military operation.” In September 2024, 50% of respondents expressed such support. It is likely that the respondents' opinions were influenced by Ukraine's invasion of the Kursk region and the transfer of military operations to Russian territory.
The current decline in the number of those willing to support the withdrawal of troops from Ukraine without achieving the goals of the “special military operation” can be explained by two factors. First, in recent months, Russian troops have made slight advances, which gives respondents the impression that victory is close and, as a result, reduces their willingness to cede territory. Second, recent public statements by Donald Trump may create the impression that a possible truce would not be a compromise but something more advantageous for Russia, which has also influenced people's opinions.
The number of respondents unwilling to support the withdrawal of troops from Ukraine without achieving the goals of the “special military operation” has been declining since February 2023 (from 47% to 31% in September 2024), but has now risen again to 46%.
What should the Russian government
do to end the war?
In the 14th wave of the Chronicles, we asked a question that had not been included in previous waves of the survey: “In your opinion, what should our country's leadership do to end the special operation?” Respondents answered in their own words. After grouping their answers, we identified four broad categories:
-
29% found it difficult to answer;
-
26% were in favor of escalation: “mobilize” (10%), “change tactics” (5%), “seize our territories” (4%), “destroy the Ukrainian leadership” (4%), “defeat or destroy Ukraine” (2%), “destroy infrastructure” (less than 1%);
-
23% are in favor of de-escalation: “compromises, concessions, signing a peace agreement” (17%), “withdrawal of troops” (3%), “negotiate with Trump” (2%), “stop at what has been achieved” (1%);
-
17% are in favor of not changing anything.
It is difficult to say what position the respondents in the “nothing should change” group hold. On the one hand, this may be a pro-war group that does not want escalation/de-escalation and is waiting for a “gradual” victory. On the other hand, people may simply not have a definite opinion and/or are using general phrases to avoid answering.
Expectations for the end of the war: hope
for Donald Trump and Xi Jinping
The most important factor influencing perceptions of the end of the war is whether respondents believe that the end of the conflict depends on specific leaders—the US, China, Russia, and Ukraine. If respondents believe that the end of hostilities is linked to these individuals, they tend to believe that the conflict will be resolved more quickly and have fewer doubts about the final outcome.
We asked respondents to rate the degree to which the resolution of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine depends on the participation of world leaders in this process on a scale from 1 (not at all dependent) to 5 (completely dependent). The results are as follows: Vladimir Putin – 4.65, Donald Trump – 3.66, Xi Jinping – 3.04, Volodymyr Zelensky – 2.1, Emmanuel Macron – 1.8.
Respondents rated the influence of Vladimir Putin, US President Donald Trump, and Chinese President Xi Jinping as the strongest. People who believe that the end of the “special military operation” depends most on one of these leaders tend to think that there are only a few months left before the end of the conflict. In addition, they are less likely to find it difficult to answer the question about when the war will end. There is a moderate and significant correlation between the perception of Trump's and Xi's influence, as well as Putin's and Xi's. This means that those who consider Trump or Putin important for resolving the conflict also highly value Xi's role. However, not many respondents associate Putin and Trump in the context of resolving the war.
Soviet experience: how family history influences views on the SMO and the authorities
We hypothesized that the Soviet family experience—both personal and passed down through generations—influences Russians' views on war, government actions, elections, and freedom of expression. Our hypothesis was that two types of experience—participation in approved Soviet institutions (the army, the party, the security forces) and, conversely, experience of repression—are reflected differently in current political positions. To test this, we added a special set of questions to the questionnaire in the 14th wave of the Chronicles survey:
Did you or your relatives have any experience related to the following aspects during the Soviet era?
-
“Were wounded or killed in the Great Patriotic War,”
-
“Received military awards,”
-
“Were you a member of the Communist Party?”
-
“Did you serve in the security forces (NKVD, KGB, militia, etc.)?”
-
“Were you imprisoned or otherwise repressed for political activity?”
-
“Were you dispossessed or forcibly resettled?”
Classification of responses about the Soviet experience
We grouped the responses into two categories that reflect different types of family experience.
The first category includes stories related to family participation in institutions that were considered honorable during the Soviet era. These include relatives' participation in the Great Patriotic War, receiving awards, serving in the NKVD, KGB, militia, and other security forces, as well as membership in the Communist Party. We called this group the Soviet experience of honor.
The second category includes cases where the family, on the contrary, found itself on the side of those who suffered under the Soviet state. This includes stories about dispossession, forced resettlement, and political repression. We called this type of experience the Soviet experience of repression.
The Soviet experience associated with honor turned out to be widespread:
-
81.7% of respondents reported that someone in their family had fought and been wounded or killed at the front,
-
70.2% said that one of their relatives had received military awards.
-
58.6% reported membership in the CPSU,
-
28.9% reported that their relatives had served in the NKVD, KGB, militia, or other security forces.
Less widespread, but still noticeable, was the Soviet experience of repression:
-
28.2% indicated that their family had been dispossessed or forcibly resettled,
-
12.9% said that one of their relatives had been subjected to political repression.
How is family history related to attitudes toward the SMO and the authorities
We compared the presence of Soviet experience in the family with answers to questions about support for the SMO, readiness for a truce, attitudes toward elections, assistance to the army and refugees, and the right to openly criticize the military operation.
Experience of honor: more trust in the authorities and less willingness to compromise
The presence of at least one element of Soviet experience of honor in the family—participation in the Great Patriotic War, receiving awards, serving in the security forces, or membership in the Communist Party—is positively associated with the following attitudes:
-
support for the SMO,
-
voting for Putin in the March 2024 elections and willingness to vote for him in the future,
-
respondents' unwillingness to accept a ceasefire without achieving the SMO's goals,
-
relatives' participation in the SMO,
-
agreement that military spending is more important than social spending,
-
support for the idea that governors should be appointed by the president,
-
approval of restrictions on public criticism of the SMO,
-
willingness to help the army, refugees, acquaintances, strangers, and public organizations.
Experience of repression: open criticism of the SMO and assistance to society
Respondents whose families had experienced Soviet repression, political repression, or dispossession of property, their attitude toward the military operation (SMO) on average does not differ from that of the rest.
However, this group differs on other issues:
-
they are less likely to be ready for a ceasefire without the achievement of the SMO's goals,
-
they are more likely to believe that Russians should be able to openly criticize the military operation,
-
and they are more willing to help strangers and organizations, including those involved with animals and plants.
At the same time, they do not differ in their attitudes toward the authorities, regional and municipal elections, or their willingness to help the army or refugees.
Soviet experience: how family history influences views on the SMO and the authorities
We hypothesized that the Soviet family experience—both personal and passed down through generations—influences Russians' views on war, government actions, elections, and freedom of expression. Our hypothesis was that two types of experience—participation in approved Soviet institutions (the army, the party, the security forces) and, conversely, experience of repression—are reflected differently in current political positions. To test this, we added a special set of questions to the questionnaire in the 14th wave of the Chronicles survey:
Did you or your relatives have any experience related to the following aspects during the Soviet era?
-
“Were wounded or killed in the Great Patriotic War,”
-
“Received military awards,”
-
“Were you a member of the Communist Party?”
-
“Did you serve in the security forces (NKVD, KGB, militia, etc.)?”
-
“Were you imprisoned or otherwise repressed for political activity?”
-
“Were you dispossessed or forcibly resettled?”
Classification of responses about the Soviet experience
We grouped the responses into two categories that reflect different types of family experience.
The first category includes stories related to family participation in institutions that were considered honorable during the Soviet era. These include relatives' participation in the Great Patriotic War, receiving awards, serving in the NKVD, KGB, militia, and other security forces, as well as membership in the Communist Party. We called this group the Soviet experience of honor.
The second category includes cases where the family, on the contrary, found itself on the side of those who suffered under the Soviet state. This includes stories about dispossession, forced resettlement, and political repression. We called this type of experience the Soviet experience of repression.
The Soviet experience associated with honor turned out to be widespread:
-
81.7% of respondents reported that someone in their family had fought and been wounded or killed at the front,
-
70.2% said that one of their relatives had received military awards.
-
58.6% reported membership in the CPSU,
-
28.9% reported that their relatives had served in the NKVD, KGB, militia, or other security forces.
Less widespread, but still noticeable, was the Soviet experience of repression:
-
28.2% indicated that their family had been dispossessed or forcibly resettled,
-
12.9% said that one of their relatives had been subjected to political repression.
How is family history related to attitudes toward the SMO and the authorities
We compared the presence of Soviet experience in the family with answers to questions about support for the SMO, readiness for a truce, attitudes toward elections, assistance to the army and refugees, and the right to openly criticize the military operation.
Experience of honor: more trust in the authorities and less willingness to compromise
The presence of at least one element of Soviet experience of honor in the family—participation in the Great Patriotic War, receiving awards, serving in the security forces, or membership in the Communist Party—is positively associated with the following attitudes:
-
support for the SMO,
-
voting for Putin in the March 2024 elections and willingness to vote for him in the future,
-
respondents' unwillingness to accept a ceasefire without achieving the SMO's goals,
-
relatives' participation in the SMO,
-
agreement that military spending is more important than social spending,
-
support for the idea that governors should be appointed by the president,
-
approval of restrictions on public criticism of the SMO,
-
willingness to help the army, refugees, acquaintances, strangers, and public organizations.
Experience of repression: open criticism of the SMO and assistance to society
Respondents whose families had experienced Soviet repression, political repression, or dispossession of property, their attitude toward the military operation (SMO) on average does not differ from that of the rest.
However, this group differs on other issues:
-
they are less likely to be ready for a ceasefire without the achievement of the SMO's goals,
-
they are more likely to believe that Russians should be able to openly criticize the military operation,
-
and they are more willing to help strangers and organizations, including those involved with animals and plants.
At the same time, they do not differ in their attitudes toward the authorities, regional and municipal elections, or their willingness to help the army or refugees.