Chronicles 13
2 years of war and citizens’ expectations
from the “special electoral operation”
On January 23-29, the Chronicles research project conducted an all-Russian survey in which 1,602 respondents participated. The main topics of the survey were the attitude of Russians towards war and mobilization, as well as studying the difference between the desires of citizens and their expectations from the winner of the “special electoral operation”.
Over the year, the number
of consistent supporters of the war has decreased
The number of respondents declaring support for the war is uninformative and misleading (since it includes a wide range of opinions from “I lie because I fear persecution” to “I volunteered for the front”), so we use a combination of 3 questions to estimate the number of consistent supporters of war and peace:
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Attitude towards "special military operation"
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Attitude towards the withdrawal of troops from the territory of Ukraine without achieving the goals of the war
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Attitude to the priorities of the state budget: for the army or for the social sphere
Over the year, the number
of consistent supporters of the war has decreased
The number of respondents declaring support for the war is uninformative and misleading (since it includes a wide range of opinions from “I lie because I fear persecution” to “I volunteered for the front”), so we use a combination of 3 questions to estimate the number of consistent supporters of war and peace:
-
Attitude towards "special military operation"
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Attitude towards the withdrawal of troops from the territory of Ukraine without achieving the goals of the war
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Attitude to the priorities of the state budget: for the army or for the social sphere
Вопрос: Если Владимир Путин примет решение вывести российские войска с территории Украины и начнет переговоры о перемирии, НЕ достигнув изначально поставленных целей военной операции, вы поддержите или не поддержите такое решение?
Mobilization: bring people home,
do not mobilize any more
We asked respondents the question: “Some believe that a new mobilization is necessary to replace those mobilized in the fall of 2022. The latter believe that everything should be left as it is. Still others believe that it is necessary to return those mobilized home without conducting a new mobilization. Which point of view is closer to you - the first, second or third?
The least popular option is new mobilization (17%). The most popular option is to return those mobilized home without conducting a new mobilization (29%). 26% were in favor of maintaining the current state of affairs. It is interesting that among citizens who declare support for the war, the distribution of opinions does not differ as much as one might expect: only 22% are in favor of a new mobilization, another 34% would prefer to leave everything as it is, and 12% are in favor return of those mobilized home without a new mobilization.
Russians want an end to the war and friendship with the West, but Putin is expected to mobilize and increase spending on the army
We asked how respondents see the future of the country after the elections if Putin or a conventional “ideal” candidate wins, and we also asked respondents about their desired future. We asked a third of the respondents about their expectations from Putin if he wins, a third about their expectations from the “ideal” candidate, and another third about what events they would like to see in the coming year.
Voting strategies: not for Putin = against war
There is an interesting pattern between the respondents’ strategy of (non)participation in voting and their declared attitude towards the “SVO”: refusal to participate in the vote or choosing any other candidate other than Putin correlates either with clear disagreement with what is happening in Ukraine (in the case of the “protest” "group), or with a desire to neutralize the military agenda (in the case of voters of other candidates, even those loyal to the authorities). It can be cautiously assumed that the SVO is viewed by non-Putin voters solely as a “program” of the current president, and not as a necessary measure or something inevitable, say, under a different president. Respondents in this group can present an alternative image of the future of Russia — different from what, in their opinion, V. Putin offers.