Chronicles 15
You can view the text of the full report, the questionnare and the database of respondents' responses in Russian in our repository on GitHub. If you need these files in English, please, write to us at web@chronicles.report.
Chronicles Survey Wave 15: War Impact Index, Russians Against Tax Hikes, Relatives of Combatants Now Mirror General Population
On September 26 – October 21, 2025 the Chronicles research project conducted its 15th wave of telephone surveys among the adult population of Russia. The sample is nationwide and randomized (see methodology), with 1,604 respondents. The maximum margin of error is 2.95% at a 95% confidence interval.
Key Findings
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Core indicators:
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Consistent pro-war: 14% (down from 18% in February 2025)
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Consistent pro-peace: 20% (down from 21% in February 2025)
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Believe that government should prioritize military spending: 31% (down from 36% in February 2025); that government should prioritize social spending: 47% (down from 48%)
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Would not support a decision to withdraw troops from Ukraine without achieving the war's stated goals: 35% (down from 46% in February 2025); would support it: 42% (up from 41%)
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Personal financial situation worsened over the past year: 35% (36% in February 2025); improved: 12% (down from 19%)
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42% of Russians oppose any tax increases. Among those open to higher taxes, more would prefer the money to go toward social programs (30%) than the military (23%).
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87% of respondents reported that their city or district has been affected by war-related consequences, internet blackouts, or shortages of medicine or fuel. Notably, drone strikes in a region correlate with higher reported support for the war, while everyday disruptions correlate with lower support.
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60% of respondents have experienced at least one of three negative conditions: a deterioration in their financial situation, job loss without finding comparable employment, or a negative impact of the war on their daily lives.
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Demand for a return to normalcy remains high: 88% want the government to focus on domestic socioeconomic problems; 65% want peace with Ukraine based on mutual concessions; 58% want to restore relations with Western countries.
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Relatives of combatants have largely converged with the general population — both in their attitudes toward the war (14% consistent war supporters, matching the overall sample) and in their financial circumstances.
Core Indicators
Trends across all key indicators from February 2022 through October 2025 are available on this page.
Our research does not rely solely on the question of whether respondents support the "special military operation," since answers to that question span a wide spectrum — from "I'm lying because I fear prosecution" to "I volunteered for the front." To generate more informative results, we use a combination of three questions:
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Do you support or not support Russia's military operation in Ukraine, or do you find it difficult to answer definitively, or prefer not to answer?
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If Vladimir Putin decided to withdraw Russian troops from Ukraine and begin negotiations without having achieved the operation's original goals, would you support or not support that decision?
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In your view, if there is a budget shortfall, where should government funds be directed first — to the armed forces, or to the social sector, including healthcare, education, and pensions?
Consistent pro-war are those who simultaneously:
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expressed support for the "special military operation" (50%)
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would not support a decision to withdraw troops and begin peace talks without having achieved the goals of the "special military operation" (35%)
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believe that in a budget shortfall, the government's priority should be the military, not social spending (31%)
As of October 2025, this group stands at 14% (down from 18% in February 2025).
Consistent pro-peace are those who simultaneously:
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did not express support for the "special military operation" (50%)
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would support a decision to withdraw troops and begin peace talks without having achieved the goals of the "special military operation" (42%)
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believe that in a budget shortfall, the government's priority should be social spending, not the military (47%)
As of October 2025, this group stands at 20% (down slightly from 21% in February 2025).
Attitudes Toward Tax Increases
To gauge Russians' willingness to personally finance the war through higher taxes, we ran an experiment: respondents were randomly divided into three groups, each presented with one of three tax-increase scenarios.
Scenario 1 — tax increase leading to an unspecified rise in prices:
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42% would not agree to any tax increase for any purpose
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32% would agree to higher taxes to fund social programs
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23% would agree to higher taxes to fund the military and defense industry
Scenario 2 — tax increase leading to a 5% rise in prices:
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36% would not agree to any tax increase for any purpose
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33% would agree to higher taxes to fund social programs
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24% would agree to higher taxes to fund the military and defense industry
Scenario 3 — tax increase leading to a 15% rise in prices:
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48% would not agree to any tax increase for any purpose
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27% would agree to higher taxes to fund social programs
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23% would agree to higher taxes to fund the military and defense industry
Detailed analysis reveals a sharp divide. Among those willing to pay higher taxes to support the military and the "new territories," declared support for the war exceeds 70%. By contrast, among those who favor civilian spending or oppose tax increases altogether, roughly 60% do not express support for the war. The tax question has become a marker of political and socioeconomic fault lines within Russian society.
Willingness to personally fund the war is directly tied to financial standing. Those who would accept higher taxes for the military are the most affluent group — up to 20% say the war has had a positive effect on their lives. Those opposed to any tax increases are the most economically vulnerable: 64% have low incomes, and 43–48% report a deterioration in their situation. Those who favor civilian spending represent a "middle class" that is feeling the negative effects of the war but wants resources directed toward domestic development.
The War Impact Index
The war has touched 87% of respondents through negative effects on their town or district, and 60% personally.
We constructed a War Impact Index based on the negative consequences respondents have experienced:
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Events in respondents' city or district over the past six months:
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Mobile internet outages: 72%
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Shelling or drone strikes: 47%
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Disruptions to rail or air travel: 32%
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Power or water outages: 31%
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Fuel shortages at gas stations: 21%
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Medicine shortages at pharmacies or medical facilities: 13%
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None of the above: 13%
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Changes in personal financial situation over the past year:
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Worsened: 35% (36% in February 2025)
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Improved: 12% (19% in February 2025)
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Other personal impacts:
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Lost a job and unable to find comparable or better employment: 10%
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Lost savings: 12% (50% report having no savings at all)
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Effect of the war on daily life:
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Positive effect: 7% (9% in February 2025)
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Negative effect: 42% (54% in February 2025)
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40% of respondents have experienced no personal negative consequences; 35% have experienced one; 20% have experienced two; 4% have experienced three.
Each negative event a respondent has experienced correlates with roughly 13% lower declared support for the war and 5% lower unwillingness to support a troop withdrawal without having achieved stated goals of the war. That said, different types of events affect attitudes differently. Direct military events — shelling, drone strikes, and transportation disruptions — correlate with higher declared support for the war (by 5–7%) and greater unwillingness to support a withdrawal (by 4–5%). Everyday disruptions — mobile internet and power outages — correlate with lower declared support (by 7–11%) and less resistance to a withdrawal of troops from Ukraine without having reached war goals (by 4%).
Relatives of Combatants Have Nearly Converged With the General Population
From February 2023 onward, combatants rated their financial situation roughly 19% higher on average than other respondents, while their relatives rated theirs only 2% higher. Since February 2025, that gap has widened for combatants — they now rate their situation 26% higher than others — while their families have fully converged with the general public in terms of financial well-being.
Over the period since 2023, combatants assessed their income trajectory more optimistically than others: only 24% reported a worsening (compared to 32% among relatives and 34% among the general population), while 32% reported improvement — significantly more than among family members or ordinary citizens (17% each).
Since February 2025, however, the distinctions have begun to erode. Over the past year:
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30% of combatants and 35% of their relatives reported a deterioration in their financial situation (vs. 36% of other respondents)
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20% of combatants and 17% of their relatives reported an improvement (vs. 15% of other respondents)
These figures show that combatants still feel financially more secure than their relatives or the general public. The financial benefits of military service, however, have barely trickled down to their families. And over the past year, combatants themselves have increasingly experienced financial strain — their trajectory is gradually approaching that of non-participants.
Relatives of combatants have also largely converged with the rest of the population in their attitudes toward the war. Consistent war supporters stand at 14% among relatives — matching the overall sample — while consistent peace supporters stand at 18% among relatives, compared to 21% for the sample as a whole.
