Chronicles 15
You can view the text of the full report, the questionnare and the database of respondents' responses in Russian in our repository on GitHub. If you need these files in English, please, write to us at web@chronicles.report.
The 15th wave of the Chronicles survey: the war impact index, Russians against tax increases, relatives of war participants almost indistinguishable from other Russians
From September 26 to October 21, 2025, the Chronicles research project conducted its 15th wave of telephone surveys among the adult population of Russia. The sample was nationwide and random (more details about the method), with 1,604 respondents. The maximum margin of error is 2.95% with a 95% confidence interval.
The main thing:
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Key indicators:
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Consistent supporters of the war: 14% (in February 2025, it was 18%)
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Consistent supporters of peace: 20% (in February 2025, it was 21%)
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Believe that the army should be the budget priority: 31% (in February 2025, it was 36%), that the social sphere should be the priority: 47% (in February 2025, it was 48%)
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Would not support the decision to withdraw troops from Ukraine without achieving the war aims: 35% (in February 2025, it was 46%), would support it: 42% (in February 2025, it was 41%)
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Over the past year, the financial situation has worsened for 35% of respondents (in February 2025, it was 36%) and improved for 12% (in February 2025, it was 19%).
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42% of Russians oppose tax increases. At the same time, more respondents would prefer additional taxes to be spent on social development (30%) rather than on the military (23%).
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87% of respondents noted that their city or district had been affected by the consequences of the war, internet blockages, or shortages of medicine or gasoline. At the same time, drone attacks in the region correlate with higher declared support for the war, while everyday problems correlate with lower support.
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Sixty percent of respondents experienced at least one of three negative factors: their financial situation worsened, they lost their jobs and were unable to find a better one, and they noted the negative impact of the war on their daily lives.
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The demand for normalization of life remains high: 88% of respondents want the government to focus on solving internal socio-economic problems this year, 65% want peace with Ukraine with mutual concessions, and 58% want to restore relations with Western countries.
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Relatives of war participants hardly differ from other respondents in their attitudes toward the war (14% are consistent supporters of the war, as is the sample average, and 18% are consistent supporters of peace, compared to 21%) or in changes in their financial situation.
Key indicators
You can view the dynamics of key indicators from February 2022 to October 2025 on this page.
In our research, we do not focus solely on the question of support for the “SVO” because the answers to this question cover a wide range of opinions, from “I am lying because I fear persecution” to “I volunteered to go to the front.” To obtain more informative results, we use a combination of three questions:
Do you support or not support Russia's military operation in Ukraine, find it difficult to answer unequivocally, or do not want to answer this question?
If Vladimir Putin decides to withdraw Russian troops from Ukraine and begin negotiations for a truce without achieving the original goals of the special operation, would you support or not support such a decision?
In your opinion, in the event of a budget deficit, where should public funds be spent first — on the armed forces or on social services, including healthcare, education, and pensions?
We include in the group of consistent supporters of the war those who simultaneously:
expressed support for the “special military operation” (50%)
would not support the decision to withdraw troops from Ukraine and start peace talks without achieving the goals of the “special military operation” (35%)
believe that in the context of a budget deficit, the government's priority should be the army, not social services (31%).
In October 2025, such people accounted for 14% (in February 2025, they accounted for 18%).
We include in the group of consistent supporters of peace those who simultaneously:
did not express support for the “special military operation” (50%)
would support the decision to withdraw troops from Ukraine and begin peace talks without achieving the goals of the “special military operation” (42%)
believe that in conditions of budget deficit, the government's priority should be the social sphere, not the army (47%).
In October 2025, such people accounted for 20% (in February 2025, it was 21%).
Attitude toward tax increases
To test Russians' willingness to finance the war with their own money (expressed in their willingness to pay higher taxes), we conducted an experiment: respondents were randomly divided into three groups, each of which was offered one of three tax increase scenarios:
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a tax increase that would lead to an uncertain rise in prices
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42% would not agree to a tax increase for any purpose
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32% would agree to a tax increase for the sake of social services
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23% would agree to a tax increase for the sake of the army and the military-industrial complex
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a tax increase that would lead to a 5% increase in prices
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36% would not agree to tax increases for any purpose
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33% would agree to tax increases for the sake of social services
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24% would agree to tax increases for the sake of the military and the military-industrial complex
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tax increases that would lead to a 15% rise in prices
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48% would not agree to tax increases for any purpose
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27% would agree to tax increases for social welfare
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23% would agree to tax increases for the military and defense industry
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A detailed analysis revealed a split. Among those who are willing to raise taxes for the army and “new regions,” the level of declared support for the war exceeds 70%. In contrast, among those who choose civilian purposes or oppose tax increases in principle, about 60% do not declare their support for the war. The tax issue has become a marker of political and socio-economic divisions in society.
Willingness to finance the war with personal money (albeit collected in the form of taxes) is directly related to financial status. Those who would agree to tax increases for the sake of the army and the military-industrial complex are the most affluent group, among whom up to 20% say that the war has had a positive impact on their lives. Opponents of taxes are the most vulnerable category: 64% are people with low incomes, 43–48% of whom report a deterioration in their situation. Supporters of civilian goals represent the “middle class,” which feels the negative consequences of the war but seeks to direct resources toward domestic development.
Negative Impact of War Index
The war has affected 87% of respondents through its negative impact on their communities and 60% of the population through its negative impact on them personally.
We have compiled an index of the negative impact of the war on the lives of Russians based on the negative consequences of the war on their lives:
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Events that have occurred in a community or area over the past six months:
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Mobile internet outages (72% of respondents)
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Shelling, drone attacks (47% of respondents)
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Disruptions to rail or airport services (32% of respondents)
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Power and water outages (31% of respondents)
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Gasoline shortages at gas stations (21% of respondents)
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Shortages of medicines in pharmacies or medical facilities (13% of respondents)
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None of the above (13%)
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Change in personal financial situation over the past year
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35% reported a deterioration (in February 2025, it was 36%)
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12% reported an improvement (in February 2025, it was 19%)
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Loss of job and inability to find the same or better (10% of respondents)
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Loss of savings (12% of respondents; 50% reported having no savings)
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Impact of the special operation on daily life
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7% reported a positive impact (in February 2025, it was 9%)
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42% reported a negative impact (in February 2025, it was 54%)
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40% of respondents did not experience any personal negative consequences, 35% experienced one element of personal negative consequences, 20% experienced two elements of personal negative consequences, and 4% experienced three elements of personal negative consequences.
Each negative event experienced by a respondent is associated with lower (on average by 13%) declared support for the war and lower unwillingness (on average by 5%) to withdraw troops from Ukraine without achieving the objectives. At the same time, different events have different effects on attitudes toward the war. Direct combat operations — shelling, drone attacks, disruptions to railways and airports — correlate with higher declared support for the war (by 5–7%) and greater unwillingness to support the withdrawal of troops from Ukraine without achieving the objectives (by 4–5%). However, everyday consequences — such as mobile internet and electricity outages — are associated with lower declared support for the war (by 7–11%) and lower unwillingness to support the withdrawal of troops from Ukraine without achieving the objectives (by 4%).
The relatives of war veterans have become almost indistinguishable from other Russians.
Starting in February 2023, war veterans rated their financial situation as 19% higher on average than other respondents, while their relatives rated it only 2% higher. Since February 2025, this gap has widened even further: participants now rate their situation as 26% higher than others, while their families' financial well-being has finally caught up with that of other citizens.
Since 2023, war veterans have been more optimistic than others about the dynamics of their income. Only 24% of them noted a deterioration in their situation (compared to 32% of relatives and 34% of all others). And 32% of military personnel reported an improvement in their income, which is significantly more than among their families and ordinary citizens (17% each).
However, since February 2025, the differences have begun to fade. Over the past year (since February 2025):
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30% of war veterans and 35% of their relatives reported a deterioration in their financial situation (compared to 36% of other respondents).
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20% of participants and 17% of relatives reported an improvement in their financial situation (among other respondents — 15%).
These data show that war participants feel more financially secure than their relatives or other citizens. At the same time, the benefits of participating in the war have virtually no impact on the well-being of their families. But over the past year, the participants themselves have begun to experience financial difficulties more often: the dynamics of their financial situation is gradually approaching that of those who are not participating in the war.
The relatives of war participants have almost ceased to differ from everyone else in their attitude toward the war. On average, 14% of consistent supporters of the war, as well as 21% of relatives of war participants, and 18% of relatives of participants, are consistent supporters of peace.
